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16 Emerging trends in the dispute 
settlement mechanism in the 
Free Trade Agreements of China, 
South Korea and Japan
Rajesh Sharma1
Asian countries jumped on the bandwagon signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) at a 
considerably fast speed, after the collapse of the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at Cancun in 2003. The Asian economic drivers like China and India 
were new in this journey. ASEAN countries, on the other hand, were focusing on establishing 
their ASEAN free trade zone, which was in the early stages of development. At the same 
time, ASEAN started negotiating with China, Japan and South Korea to form an ASEAN+3 
Agreement. India also joined the same club by forming an extended ASEAN+4. Among 
Asian countries, Singapore, Japan and South Korea started negotiating and signing FTAs 
with other economically developed countries, like the US and the EU. These countries were 
considered as like-minded countries, so FTAs with them were a natural course of action. 
Otherwise, the rest of the Asian countries were moving slowly in signing FTAs. Once China 
started ﬂexing its economic prowess, the FTAs negotiation and conclusion started taking 
new turns. This was further fuelled by the commencement of negotiations on East Asian 
Communities (EAC) envisaging the EU-type communities for the Asian Countries.
The EAC negotiations were conducted on the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings. 
However, soon, the EAC negotiations faced a stumbling block on the issue of leadership, 
the deﬁnition of Asia, mainly in terms of coverage of Asian countries within the EAC, 
including whether Australia and New Zealand should be part of the EAC or not, and above 
all, on security concerns. This inclusion issue went beyond its anticipation when Russia 
requested to join the EAC as a member, or at least, as an observer. Now, the discussion 
on the EAC has become a mere event on the side of the ASEAN meetings. Once the EAC 
negotiation started to cool down, the Asian countries started negotiating separately with 
developed and developing countries, including those in Africa and Latin America. From 
Asia, the target countries were China, Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore. Australia and New Zealand also started FTA negotiations with these countries.
Over a period of time, Asian countries started negotiating their FTAs in more sophisticated 
ways, as compared to their earlier approach of negotiating on the basis of the text prepared 
by the other parties, mainly by the developed countries. New approaches of Asian countries 
have shown new innovations in their FTAs provisions. What was considered an unfeasible 
task has started becoming a reality. New experiments have been made. This chapter focuses 
on these new experiments and trends emerging from the State-to-State dispute settlement 
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provisions of the FTAs of Asia. For this purpose, recently signed FTAs of China, South Korea 
and Japan with Australia will be considered. These three countries are powerful economies 
of Asia, and their approach in the dispute settlement in their FTAs can be considered as 
representative of the Asian trend. The FTAs under consideration in this chapter have also 
raised discussions on the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. For example, the 
Australia-China FTA has proposed to negotiate an appellate mechanism for Investor-State 
disputes, which is very innovative, and a hot topic in the international arena. However, as 
the focus of this chapter is on State-to-State dispute settlement, discussion on Investor-State 
disputes is beyond the scope of this chapter.
FTAs of China, South Korea and Japan with Australia
The Australia-China FTA was signed on 17 June 2015 and became effective on 20 December 
2015. The Australia-China FTA is the newest FTA of China, which represents a new trend 
in the dispute settlement mechanism of China.
Chapter 15 of the Australia-China FTA contains the State-to-State dispute settlement 
mechanism. In addition to the main provisions, this chapter includes three new items: 
(1) Code of Conduct (Annex-15-A), (2) Model Rules of Procedure for the Arbitral Tribunal 
(Annex-15-B) and (3) Indicative Time Table for the Arbitral Tribunal attached with Annex 
B (Annex 15-B). Code of Conduct, Model Rules and Time Table have now become part of 
the FTA applicable to the State v State disputes. Among these three, the Code of Conduct 
for Arbitrators has been used for the ﬁrst time.
The Korea-Australia FTA was signed on the 8 April 2014 and became effective on 
12 December 2014. Like the Australia-China FTA, the Korea-Australia FTA also shows 
some new trends in dispute settlement. The Korea-Australia FTA also includes a Code 
of Conduct (Annex 20-A), Model Rules of Procedure (Annex 20-B) and an Indicative 
Time Table for a Dispute Settlement Panel as part of the Model Rules of Procedure for 
Dispute Settlement Panel Proceedings (Attachment to Annex 2-B). From the structural 
point of view, the dispute settlement mechanisms of both the Australia-China FTA and the 
Korea-Australia FTA look similar, as Australia is the common partner in both the FTAs. 
Both FTAs were signed in close proximity, so one may see the inﬂuence of one on the other.
The other major Asian economy, Japan, has also signed an agreement with Australia, 
which included the Code of Conduct in its dispute settlement mechanism.2 In contrast with 
Korea and China, the Australia-Japan FTA requires not only arbitrators or panelists but also 
assistants and administrative personnel to comply with the Code of Conduct.3 The Obligation 
of Self-Disclosure contained in the Code of Conduct is exclusively applicable on arbitrators.4
The Code of conduct imposes a duty on arbitrators to remain independent and 
impartial5 and stresses the performance of duties by arbitrators6 and maintenance of 
 2 The Australia-Japan FTA was signed on 8 July 2014 and became effective on 15 January 2015.
 3 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure of Arbitral Tribunals, Para 6.
 4 Section IV of the Code of Conduct of the Australia-Japan FTA contains the provisions of 
Obligation of Self-Disclosure.
 5 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 12–17; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct 
Paras 11–16.
 6 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 4–10; Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 5–11.
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conﬁdentiality.7 As these obligations are important in maintaining the integrity of the 
dispute settlement system, these obligations are included in both the Australia-China FTA 
and the Korea-Australia FTA through the Code of Conduct. The Australia-Japan FTA 
enforces the Code of Conduct on arbitrators, arbitrators’ assistants and administrative 
personnel, thus, the coverage of the Code of Conduct is wider as compared to the 
Australia-China FTA and the Australia-Korea FTA.
Cooperation – a new means of dispute resolution
The Australia-China FTA follows the consistent pattern of China for the dispute settlement 
mechanism in the FTAs of Asia, which encourages “cooperation” as the ﬁrst means of 
resolving disputes and obliges the parties to “make every attempt through cooperation to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect” the operation of the 
Australia-China FTA including the agreement on “the interpretation and application of this 
Agreement.”8 The importance of cooperation as the ﬁrst port of call may be assessed by the fact 
that the recently concluded Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) also emphasises “cooperation.”9
The Korea-Australia FTA has also emphasised “cooperation” and requires parties to 
“endeavour to agree” on the interpretation and implementation of the FTA. Similar to 
the Australia-China FTA, the parties to the Korea-Australia FTA also have to “make every 
attempt through cooperation” to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter 
that might affect the operation of the Korea-Australia FTA.10
The Australia-Japan FTA does not have any stand-alone provision on cooperation, 
like the Australia-China FTA or the Korea-Australia FTA. However, the Australia-Japan 
FTA has “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation,” and the Australia-China FTA has 
“Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation,” together with a cooperation provision. The 
Korea-Australia FTA does not have “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation.” Though 
the Australia-Korea FTA shows the trend of including cooperation as a means of resolving 
disputes, at the same time excluding the means of “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and 
Mediation,” it is still too early to say whether this will be a future trend. It is also a fact that 
almost every FTA includes “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation”; however, the use 
of this method for dispute resolution is insigniﬁcant. Even at the level of WTO, the method 
of “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation” is seldom used.
Though we see the use of cooperation in the dispute settlement mechanism of FTAs now, 
it is too early to understand the implication of this provision. For example, is it an obligation 
that, if breached, may give rise to an action under the FTA? In other words, if parties do not 
cooperate during consultation or at a post-award phase, e.g., for ﬁxing of a reasonable period 
of time, would that mean the cooperation provision has been violated by the recalcitrant 
party and therefore the claimant may initiate another action against the party at fault? 
What standard should be used to ascertain whether a party has breached the cooperation 
obligations or not whenever the tribunal does face such a question? Considering the general 
approach of Asian countries to resolve the dispute amicably, the inclusion of cooperation 
 7 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 19–21; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 18–20.
 8 Australia-China FTA, Article 15.1.
 9 TPP, Article 28.2
 10 Korea-Australia FTA, Article 20.1.
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as the ﬁrst port of call for dispute resolution is laudable, but for the rule-based system of 
dispute resolution, this is far from complete and practical.
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators
Independence and impartiality in any decision-making process is a very important aspect. 
Therefore, the Code of Conduct in the Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia-FTA and 
Australia-Japan FTA has paid special attention to it and provided a general obligation on 
the arbitrators to be “independent and impartial,” to act in a “fair manner” and to avoid 
“creating an appearance of impropriety or bias”.11 It further adds that an arbitrator must 
not be inﬂuenced by self-interests, outside pressure, political considerations, public clamour, 
loyalty to a party or fear of criticism.12 Arbitrators are also required to take action in such 
a manner that it should not give any indication that people at a special position inﬂuence 
them. In order to counter that impression, arbitrators are required to make every effort to 
displace such an impression. Moreover, arbitrators are not allowed to use their position on 
the arbitral tribunal to advance any personal or private interests.13
Past dealings of arbitrators are also under the scanner in the Code of Conduct of the 
Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA. According to 
this Code, arbitrators should not let “past or existing ﬁnancial, business, professional, 
family or social relationships or responsibilities inﬂuence the arbitrators’ conduct and 
responsibilities.”14 Following this responsibility, arbitrators should also refrain from 
“entering into any relationship, or acquiring any ﬁnancial interest” that may affect 
arbitrators’ “impartiality” or “which may create an appearance of impropriety or bias.”15 
In addition to that, arbitrators are also suggested to dispel the appearance that the outcome 
of the decision may, in some way, give beneﬁt to them.16
The Code of Conduct of the Australia-China FTA imposes the responsibility on 
arbitrators to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,” to be “independent 
and impartial,” to avoid “direct and indirect conﬂicts of interests” and to observe a “high 
standard of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement process 
are preserved.”17 The exact similar responsibility has been imposed on the panelist serving 
under the Korea-Australia FTA.18 Similarly, the Australia-Japan FTA also imposes the same 
obligations on arbitrators.19 Such responsibilities towards the process of dispute settlement 
are very important and therefore each arbitrator or panelist must adhere to them.
 11 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 12; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
11; Australia-Japan FTA; Code of Conduct, Para III (c) and VI (1).
 12 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 13; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
12; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
 13 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 15; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
14; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (4).
 14 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 16; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
15; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
 15 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 17; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
17; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (2).
 16 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 18; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
14; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (4).
 17 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 18 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 1.
 19 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
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The Code of Conduct of the Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and 
Australia-Japan FTA imposes self-disclosure obligations on arbitrators from the time they 
are invited to sit on a panel to resolve a dispute.20 Arbitrators are required to disclose “any 
interests, relationship or matter that is likely to affect his or her independence or impartiality 
or that might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or bias in the proceedings.”21 
Moreover, it is an obligation on the candidate for arbitration to make “all reasonable 
efforts to become aware of any such interests, relationships and matters.”22 Such obligation 
is a continuous one, which is applicable even during the arbitration process. Therefore, 
arbitrators are required to make their own “reasonable efforts to become aware of any 
interest, relationships and matters and disclose them to the FTA Joint Commission.”23 
However, it does not say whether arbitrators are required to report to the Joint Commission 
or Committee promptly or as soon as they come to know about any interest, relationships 
and matters that may affect their independence and impartiality. As a matter of common 
practice, the reporting should be prompt and take place as soon as such knowledge is acquired. 
The Australia-Japan FTA does not have any provision of reporting to the Joint Committee 
or Commission. In these FTAs, it is to note that the code of conduct is not putting any 
obligation on parties to ﬁnd out about any conﬂict, but the onus is on arbitrators, so that in 
the future, arbitrators may not argue that such information was already known to the parties 
either directly and indirectly or was available in the public domain.
The Australia-Japan FTA has also warned that the application of these disclosure require-
ments should not be made administratively so burdensome that it becomes impracticable 
for qualiﬁed persons to serve as arbitrators. Another point of caution has been suggested 
in the Australia-Japan FTA that while meeting the disclosure requirements, the personal 
privacy of arbitrators should be respected.24 In this respect, the Australia-Japan FTA has set 
the good trend that requirements of disclosure must not transgress into the personal and 
private domain of arbitrators.
Maintenance of conﬁdentiality by arbitrators and parties
There is a general obligation of conﬁdentiality in all the three FTAs under discussion here. 
With regard to the obligation of conﬁdentiality, in the Australia-China FTA, the only 
exception is that an arbitrator or former arbitrator may only disclose conﬁdential information 
as required by legal or constitutional requirements.25 Legal obligations are common as 
an exception to the conﬁdentiality requirement; however, inclusion of “Constitutional” 
requirements is new. Neither China nor Australia has ever included code of conduct in 
their FTAs. Inclusion of Constitutional requirements may be signiﬁcant for Australia, 
but the same is not true in China. In the Chinese Constitution, there is no particular 
provision binding on arbitrators. However, in Australia, Constitution plays a signiﬁcant role 
 20 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2; 
Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para IV.
 21 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 22 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 23 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 4; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Para 3. It is to note that there is a terminological difference here because in the Korea-Australia 
FTA there is a Joint “Committee” and not the Joint “Commission”.
 24 Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para IV (3).
 25 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 21.
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in dispute settlement. Parties more frequently, unlike China, refer to the Constitutional 
provisions in court cases.
The Korea-Australia FTA does not include “Constitutional” requirements. The panelists 
or former panelists can only disclose the deliberations of the panel or views of an individual 
panelist as “required by law.”26 The panelists, as well as the person retained by the panel, 
are required to maintain the conﬁdentiality of panel proceedings and deliberations.27 It is 
a signiﬁcant departure from the Australian point of view between the two FTAs signed 
with China and Korea. Since Korea is a civil law country, the use of Constitution in 
disputes may not be frequent, but there is no explanation for the presence of Constitutional 
requirements in the Australia-China FTA, considering China is a civil law country, too. It 
is also unexplainable as to why Australia prefers inclusion of Constitutional requirements in 
the Australia-China FTA and ignores the same in the Korea-Australia FTA, knowing both 
China and Korea are civil law countries.
The Australia-Japan FTA provides for absolute conﬁdentiality, because even under legal 
or Constitutional order, any covered person, such as arbitrators, arbitrators’ assistants and 
administrative personnel, is not allowed to disclose conﬁdential information. Unlike the 
Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA, there are no exceptions, e.g., “except as 
required by legal or constitutional requirements.” Moreover, the Australia-Japan FTA does 
not impose conﬁdentiality obligation on former arbitrators, as they are obliged to maintain 
conﬁdentiality under the Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA.
Arbitrators are obliged to keep a nonpublic document conﬁdential or even cannot use it 
for the purpose other than the arbitration proceeding. It is also imperative that arbitrators 
do not use such information for their own beneﬁt or for the advantages of others or even 
to adversely affect the interest of others.28 In the Australia-Japan FTA, prohibition against 
the use of conﬁdential information does not include “interest of others” and, in that sense, 
if any conﬁdential information is used to affect the interests of others, then it is debatable 
whether it is against the code of conduct.29 The Korea-Australia FTA is similar to the 
Australia-China FTA, which prohibits the use of conﬁdential information that may affect 
the interests of others.30
Arbitration proceedings, including hearings and deliberations, as well as documents 
submitted for the purpose of arbitration, are conﬁdential.31 Not all documents can be 
conﬁdential, only those documents that are marked conﬁdential by the party providing 
that they are treated as conﬁdential by the other party. However, the party submitting 
conﬁdential information to the tribunal may have to submit a nonconﬁdential summary 
of the designated conﬁdential information within 15 days of such a request. This 
nonconﬁdential information may be made public.32 The Australia-China FTA has made it 
clear that the documents submitted for arbitration may be conﬁdential, and the obligation to 
keep that information conﬁdential is on the receiving party and not on the party providing 
 26 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 20.
 27 Korea-Australia FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 8.
 28 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 19.
 29 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VII (1).
 30 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 18.
 31 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 17. As the hearings of the arbitral tribunal is in close 
session and in deliberation only arbitrators are present so these parts of the arbitration proceeding 
are also conﬁdential. See Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Paras 9 &13.
 32 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 17.
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that conﬁdential information. Therefore, the party providing that information may make 
that information, i.e., its own position, public, and that will not be considered breach of 
conﬁdentiality obligation. It is also to note that only documents submitted in arbitration 
are conﬁdential, whereas any document prepared for arbitration or related to arbitration is 
not within the scope of the conﬁdential obligations.
In the Korea-Australia FTA, a party may designate any speciﬁc information conﬁdential 
that it considers strictly necessary to protect privacy or legitimate commercial interest of 
particular enterprises, public or private, or to address essential conﬁdentiality concerns.33 
Therefore, the scope of conﬁdentiality has been extended to private and legitimate 
commercial interest in the Korea-Australia FTA.
Conduct of arbitration proceedings
The Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA provide for the 
duties and performance-related code for arbitrators.34 The ﬁrst duty is to conduct arbitration 
proceedings “with fairness and diligence.”35 No arbitrator is allowed “to deny other ar-
bitrator from taking part in any aspect of the proceeding.”36 This may also include the 
deliberation process. It should be the responsibility of the Chairman to make sure that all 
arbitrators are included in the process from the beginning till the end. There is no such pro-
vision in the Australia-Japan FTA; however, it may be assumed that all arbitrators will take 
part in the decision-making process. The Australia-Japan FTA assumes that each arbitrator 
understands that “prompt settlement of disputes is essential to the effective functioning of 
the Australia-Japan FTA”.37
Arbitrators are not allowed “to delegate their duties of making decision on any other person.”38 
In the Australia-Japan FTA, the same obligation is included; however, the arbitral tribunal 
may permit arbitrators’ assistants, administration personnel, interpreters and translators to be 
present during its deliberations.39 This is because the Code of Conduct allows delegation of 
“duty to decide” to any person “except as provided in the Rules of Procedures.”40 However, 
the Rule of Procedures only allows covered persons to be present during deliberation; it may 
not be assumed that the covered person will make the ﬁnal decision.
This obligation of non-delegation is quite signiﬁcant in terms of the rumours that 
arbitrators ask their assistants to draft the award. The controversial Yukos award has been 
challenged by Russia, on the basis that the assistant to the tribunal spent more hours and was 
paid for those hours, which was more than the time spent by the arbitrators, suggesting that 
perhaps the assistant was asked to draft the award, which was the duty of the arbitral panel.41
 33 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules Para 21.
 34 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 5–11; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 4–10; Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para V (1–5).
 35 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 6; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 5; 
Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para V (2).
 36 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 7; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 6.
 37 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V (1).
 38 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 8; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 7.
 39 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 18.
 40 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V (4).
 41 Dmytro Galagan, “The Challenge of the Yukos Award-An Award Written by Someone Else-A 
Violation of Tribunal’s Mandate?”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, available at http://kluwerarbitration 
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In arbitration, if the tribunal requires or a party requests, an expert may be engaged to 
assist the tribunal to reach a conclusion. The expert can be an individual or a body. The 
parties will agree on the terms and conditions for engagement of the expert. Any technical 
information or views of the expert so obtained by the tribunal must be provided to the 
parties also for comments.42 This is, of course, to maintain the due process within the 
arbitration proceeding.
Use of Indicative Time Table
The Australia-China FTA provides for a clear timeline for the operation of a dispute 
resolution process. In order to strengthen the importance of time limit and timely exe-
cution of various activities, an “Indicative Time Table for the Arbitral Tribunal” is also 
added as an Annex 15-B attached with the “Model Rules of Procedure for the Arbitral 
Tribunal.”43 An outer limit for the completion of a dispute resolution procedure is set at 
270 days “from the date of establishment of the arbitral tribunal until the issuance of the 
ﬁnal report.”44 This time limit is a general rule, and parties with agreement may change the 
number of days. If the general rule is adhered to, then it is possible to resolve disputes faster 
under the Australia-China FTA, as compared to any other forum.
A similar trend is also noticed in the Korea-Australia FTA, which includes an Indicative 
Time Table for Dispute Settlement Panel, attached to the Model Rules of Procedure for 
Dispute Settlement Panel Proceedings.45 According to this time table, a ﬁnal report is 
expected to be issued between 170 and 240 days from the date of establishment of the 
panel. However, the upper limit of deadline for the issuance of ﬁnal report is 270 days, 
which is the same as that of the Australia-China FTA.46
The Indicative Time Table in the Australia-Japan FTA is even shorter than that of the 
Korea-Australia FTA. In the Australia-Japan FTA, a period of 23–26 weeks is given, which 
is approximately 161–182 days from the date of establishment of the tribunal to release the 
award to the parties.47 At the same time, Proceedings of Arbitral Tribunal declares that 
the maximum days to issue the award to the parties must not be more than 6 months, 
which is approximately 180 days.48 Therefore, in terms of number of days, arbitrators have 
less time under the Australia-Japan FTA as compared to the Australia-China FTA and 
Korea-Australia FTA. From the parties’ point of view, the tribunal can decide a dispute 
faster in the Australia-Japan FTA. All these dates are, of course, a general guideline and 
with the agreement of the parties, it can be extended.49
A time period for the written submissions and documents is also set under the 
Australia-China FTA. For example, the complaining party is required to submit its ﬁrst 
blog.com/2015/02/27/the-challenge-of-the-yukos-award-an-award-written-by-someone-else-a-
violation-of-the-tribunals-mandate/.
 42 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 20; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 26.
 43 See Annex 15-B of Australia-China FTA.
 44 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 2.
 45 See Annex 20-B of Korea-Australia FTA.
 46 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 2 and Annex 20-B.
 47 Australia-Japan FTA, Indicative Time Table, Attachment A.
 48 Australia-Japan FTA, Para 19.9 (6).
 49 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 2; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 2; Australia- 
Japan FTA, Article 19.9 (6).
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written document within 14 days from the date of appointment of the ﬁnal arbitrator, and 
the party complained against is then supposed to submit its reply within 30 days from the 
date of delivery of the ﬁrst written submission by the complaining party.50 The complain-
ing party, in the Korea-Australia FTA, also has 14 days to make its written submission, 
but the respondent has only 21 days.51 In the Australia-Japan FTA, both the complaining 
party and the party complained against have a shorter time, i.e., 10 days and 20 days, 
respectively.52
It may seem unreasonable to give less time to the complaining party as compared to the 
party complained against. However, this may not be the case, as the complaining party 
might have prepared and already submitted most of the information regarding the dispute 
at the time of ﬁling the notice for consultation and for the request for the establishment of 
the panel to resolve the dispute. Therefore, a lesser time period given to the complaining 
party is justiﬁed.
The arbitral tribunal, in the Australia-China FTA, is obligated to commence hearing 30 
days after the submission of the party complained against.53 The initial report also needs 
to be issued 30 days after the receipt of the written supplementary submissions by the 
parties.54 That means that the tribunal has to work at a fast pace to complete the writing of 
the report. Parties are also required to react faster, as they are given only 10 days to make 
written comments on the initial report.55 Thereafter, the tribunal gets only 20 days to make 
the ﬁnal report to the parties.56
The process is even faster in the Korea-Australia FTA, as the tribunal ﬁxes the ﬁrst hearing 
with parties within 20–45 days, and the initial report is issued 60–90 days thereafter. 
However, parties get more days (14 days) to give their comments on the initial report, as 
compared to the Australia-China FTA. The ﬁnal report is made available to the parties 
in 31 days.57 As a general rule, in the Korea-Australia FTA, the panel is bound to give 
“sufﬁcient time to the parties to prepare their submissions.”58
The arbitration process is very fast in the Australia-Japan FTA; therefore, all time 
limits are shorter, as compared to the Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA. 
However, in the Australia-Japan FTA, parties get two substantive hearings, whilst in the 
Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA, parties get only one hearing.59 In the 
Australia-China FTA, however, parties are allowed to provide written supplementary sub-
missions after the ﬁrst hearing.60 Though the time limit is very short in the Australia- 
Japan FTA, the time period to give comments on the draft award is longer, i.e., 15 days, 
as compared to the Australia-China FTA (10 days) and Korea-Australia FTA (14 days). 
The ﬁnal award in the Australia-Japan FTA is issued to the parties in 15 days after the 
 50 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 4.
 51 Korea-Australia, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para (a).
 52 Australia-Japan FTA, Indicative Time-Table, Para (b).
 53 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 2.
 54 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 4.
 55 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 5.
 56 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 6. The time limit is 30 days from 
the date of issuance of the initial report which includes 10 days for the comments to receive from 
the parties.
 57 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Annex 20-B.
 58 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 3.
 59 Australia-Korea FTA, Indicative Time-Table, Annex A, Paras c & e.
 60 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Indicative Time-Table, Para 3.
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submission on their comments, which is faster than the Australia-China FTA (20 days) 
and Korea-Australia FTA (31 days).
Presence of arbitrators in hearings and deliberations
All arbitrators in the hearings and deliberations under the Australia-China FTA are 
required to be present, even though assistants, translators and designated note-takers may 
be present during the hearings who are not allowed to take part in the deliberations.61 In 
the Korea-Australia FTA, assistants, interpreters or translators or designated note-takers 
may be present in the hearings, and with the permission of the parties, they may also 
be present in deliberations.62 In the Australia-Japan FTA, the tribunal may permit the 
presence of arbitrators’ assistants, administration personnel, interpreters and translators 
during deliberations.63 For this purpose, the tribunal in the Australia-Japan FTA may not 
be required to consult parties. Therefore, whilst the Australia-China FTA allows assistants, 
note-takers, interpreters and translators only during hearings but not in deliberations, 
the Korea-Australia FTA allows them to be present in deliberations (and assumed to be 
present during hearings, too). However, according to the Australia-Japan FTA, the tribunal 
on its own may allow those people to be present during deliberations and assume that 
they are allowed to be present during hearings; this is also similar to the situation in the 
Korea-Australia FTA.
All the meetings of the tribunal must be presided over by the Chair of the Tribunal. 
Other arbitrators may delegate authority to the Chair to deal with administrative and 
procedural decisions.64 Such delegation of the authority is good for the efﬁciency of the 
arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes in a speedy matter. There are several administrative 
and procedural decisions that are important that can be taken by the Chair alone, without 
involving other arbitrators.
In the Australia-China FTA, arbitral hearings are not mandatory. They can only be 
organised if parties agree to an oral hearing.65 In case the oral hearing is arranged, the 
tribunal must ensure an equal amount of time for each party.66 The Chair of the Tribunal 
ﬁxes the time limit with a view to providing equal time to parties.67 It is to note that due 
process is satisﬁed by giving an equal amount of time, and there is no obligation to provide 
a “reasonable,” “full” or “adequate” opportunity to present the case. At the hearing, 
ﬁrst the complaining party is given the opportunity to make its argument, followed by 
arguments of the party complained against. After the main arguments, the complaining 
party is given time to make a reply, followed by a counter-reply by the party complained 
against.68
 61 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 9.
 62 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 7.
 63 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 18.
 64 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 10; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 5; Australia- 
Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 16.
 65 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 12.
 66 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
 67 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
 68 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
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Language in arbitration
Chinese is the language of China, and English is the language of Australia, but the 
Australia-China FTA includes English as the working language of the arbitral proceeding. 
This is not a strange provision, considering China has agreed to use English as the working 
language in other FTAs that it has signed.
The Australia-Japan FTA provides use of dual language in arbitration. It provides that the 
proceedings of the arbitral tribunal are to be conducted in both English and Japanese. The 
same condition is also applicable on oral and written submissions.69 It is the obligation on 
a party to provide translation of the written submission in the language of the other party 
and consequently bear the cost of translation.70 In other words, if Australia submits a docu-
ment in English, then it has to get that document translated into Japanese and also bear the 
cost of the translation. However, the cost of interpretation is borne by the parties in equal 
share. For the purpose of interpretation, the Australia-Japan FTA provides a general rule 
that the party in whose capital a meeting is held will be responsible for organising interpre-
tation services for the meeting.71 One may argue that the use of dual languages may delay 
the process; at the same time, it may also be argued that a proceeding in a native language 
of the parties may result in a well-informed decision. China and Korea also have language 
differences with Australia, but those two countries have not agreed to the dual languages 
proceeding with Australia.
Venue of hearing
It is believed that parties in a dispute may enjoy the local advantage if the venue of the 
hearing is set in their country. This presumption is dispelled in the Australia-China FTA. 
The parties’ agreement is respected in the Australia-China FTA, so the ﬁrst method of 
deciding the venue of the hearing is through parties’ agreement. If, for some reasons, 
parties cannot agree on the venue of the arbitration hearing, then as default rule, the ﬁrst 
hearing will be conducted in the territory of the parties complained against. The second 
hearing and any further hearings thereafter will be conducted alternatively in the territories 
of the parties. In other words, the second hearing will be conducted in the territory of the 
complaining party, and the third hearing will be organised in the territory of the party 
complained against.72 A similar approach has been adopted in the Korea-Australia FTA, 
too.73 However, the decision on the venue of the meeting has been left to the Chair in 
the Australia-Japan FTA to decide in consultation with the parties and other arbitrators.74 
There is no default rule on venue in the Australia-Japan FTA, similar to the Australia-China 
FTA and Australia-Japan FTA.
Considering the size of China and Australia, parties still have to agree on the venue, for 
example, whether the venue of the hearing should be in the capital or any other place. The 
Model Rules in the Australia-China FTA do not shed any light on that. Therefore, for all 
practical purposes, both Australia and China have to agree on a venue. The only innovation 
 69 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 37.
 70 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 38.
 71 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 39.
 72 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 22.
 73 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 29.
 74 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 4.
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one can note in this provision is that the venue is not limited to the capital city; rather, it 
could be organised anywhere within the territory of a party. Depending upon the nature of 
the dispute, sometimes it would be helpful to organise the hearing at a place that has more 
evidence of the measures in dispute.
Implications of violations of the Code of Conduct
Violation of the Code of Conduct by an arbitrator is itself a determinable matter; 
therefore, no arbitrator is allowed to “communicate matters concerning actual or potential 
violations.”75 If the matter is necessary to ascertain whether an arbitrator has violated 
or may violate the Code of Conduct, then an arbitrator may communicate such matter, 
otherwise that arbitrator has to inform both parties. This is perhaps for the purpose of 
maintaining the integrity of the questionable arbitrator, unless the FTA Joint Committee 
of the Australia-China FTA or Korea-Australia FTA, as the case may be, ﬁnally resolves 
the matter. China, Korea and Japan have set the trend of making the violation of code of 
conduct itself a disputable ground.
Arbitrators in a commercial arbitration are familiar with such codes, but the same 
arbitrators may not be compelled to follow such codes when deciding State v State disputes 
under FTAs. Now, with the inclusion of the Code of Conduct in the Australia-China FTA, 
Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA, arbitrators will be bound by the code, and 
violation of this code may lead to removal of arbitrators.
Conclusion
China, South Korea and Japan have set a new and positive trend in the dispute settlement 
mechanism of their FTAs. The most important trend is to include the Code of Conduct 
for arbitrators in the dispute settlement system. This Code of Conduct is a package, 
which covers independence, impartiality and other necessary measures that are important 
for maintaining the integrity of the dispute-resolution mechanism. In the commercial 
arbitration world, such measures are common and have been in use for a long time; how-
ever in the FTA dispute-resolution system, such measures were not used until recently. 
In other words, arbitrators under the FTA dispute settlement system were not under 
strict scrutiny, as compared to any commercial arbitration. The whole Code of Conduct 
is binding on arbitrators, which is a very positive development, but the rule relating to 
self-disclosure is far more important. According to this rule, the obligation is on the ar-
bitrator to disclose any situation of actual or apparent bias and not on the parties. From 
the parties’ perspective, this is a big relief. In this regard, it is also important to note 
that the personal and private information of arbitrators should not be of public scrutiny. 
Therefore, Japan has made it clear that the obligations of self-disclosure on arbitrators 
should not be administratively cumbersome and go beyond its purpose, so that a quali-
ﬁed person may not be able to perform the main duty of resolving disputes. In essence, a 
ﬁne balance should be maintained for this purpose. Separate Model Rules of Procedures 
for arbitration are another signiﬁcant development in the FTAs of China, South Korea 
and Japan, which provide default rules for arbitration, unless parties agree otherwise. In 
 75 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 11; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Para 10. Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V(5)
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the FTA dispute settlement system, earlier emphasis was not put on rules of procedure, 
but rather, it was left open for the tribunal to design or adopt them in consultation with 
parties. The default rules are now available for the arbitral tribunal to follow, which has 
been negotiated between the parties. The presence of default rules in the FTAs of China, 
South Korea and Japan will help develop a consistent application of rules in any arbitra-
tion under the respective FTAs. Similarly, an Indicative Time Table sets the clock right 
from the beginning for the parties, as well as for the Tribunal, to resolve the disputes in 
a timely manner. From a logistics point of view, the Time Table is easy to refer to now, as 
compared to the past. In the earlier FTAs, one could only calculate the time period by 
reading various provisions in the FTAs. From the users’ point of view, one may quickly 
compare as to which FTAs may help resolve the dispute in a timely manner. Arbitrators 
will also be mindful of the time limit before they accept appointment. Otherwise, in 
commercial arbitration or in investment arbitration, delay in issuing the award has be-
come very common. Finally, use of cooperation as the means of dispute resolution has 
become the hallmark of Asian FTAs, particularly those of China and South Korea. From 
an Asian perspective, cooperation between disputants is always appreciated in resolving 
their disputes. However, it is not settled yet, the legal implication of this cooperation 
provision as to whether any violation of this obligation may give rise to any cause of 
action or not.
It has been argued that proliferation of FTAs may have an impact on the domestic 
courts in the administration of justice. Similar arguments have been raised about the 
impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on domestic jurisdiction, which is a valid 
point. This is because, as a member of the WTO, all members are required to align their 
domestic rules with the WTO rules. For example, law on intellectual property rights, 
anti-dumping and so on are a few examples that forced every members of the WTO to 
amend their local laws in line with the WTO rules. China is one example, which has 
to amend more than a thousand legislations and rules to bring them in line with the 
WTO requirements. If there is any violation of WTO rules, then a member of the WTO 
may initiate dispute against the member who is alleged to violate WTO rules. The general 
impact of FTA on domestic legislation has not been evident. One may see the change in 
rules in favour of FTA partners. For example, change in rules of origin, lower threshold for 
establishing service companies and so forth may have been put in place in light of speciﬁc 
FTAs. To this extent, one may argue that FTAs have some impact on domestic legislations. 
At the same time, it should be noted that such favourable treatment to a FTA partner is 
allowed under the WTO, and it is not considered as the violation of Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle. Disputes under FTAs are not common. In Asia, no bilateral FTA has 
been invoked yet for a formal dispute settlement. However, a rule-based dispute settlement 
system in a FTA gives predictability about how a dispute might be resolved as and when 
that may arise.
With these new trends in action, one may conclude that China, South Korea and Japan 
are developing a new Asian style of dispute resolution mechanism in their FTAs, whether 
signed with developed or developing countries.
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Asian countries jumped on the bandwagon signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) at a 
considerably fast speed, after the collapse of the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at Cancun in 2003. The Asian economic drivers like China and India 
were new in this journey. ASEAN countries, on the other hand, were focusing on establishing 
their ASEAN free trade zone, which was in the early stages of development. At the same 
time, ASEAN started negotiating with China, Japan and South Korea to form an ASEAN+3 
Agreement. India also joined the same club by forming an extended ASEAN+4. Among 
Asian countries, Singapore, Japan and South Korea started negotiating and signing FTAs 
with other economically developed countries, like the US and the EU. These countries were 
considered as like-minded countries, so FTAs with them were a natural course of action. 
Otherwise, the rest of the Asian countries were moving slowly in signing FTAs. Once China 
started ﬂexing its economic prowess, the FTAs negotiation and conclusion started taking 
new turns. This was further fuelled by the commencement of negotiations on East Asian 
Communities (EAC) envisaging the EU-type communities for the Asian Countries.
The EAC negotiations were conducted on the sidelines of the ASEAN meetings. 
However, soon, the EAC negotiations faced a stumbling block on the issue of leadership, 
the deﬁnition of Asia, mainly in terms of coverage of Asian countries within the EAC, 
including whether Australia and New Zealand should be part of the EAC or not, and above 
all, on security concerns. This inclusion issue went beyond its anticipation when Russia 
requested to join the EAC as a member, or at least, as an observer. Now, the discussion 
on the EAC has become a mere event on the side of the ASEAN meetings. Once the EAC 
negotiation started to cool down, the Asian countries started negotiating separately with 
developed and developing countries, including those in Africa and Latin America. From 
Asia, the target countries were China, Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore. Australia and New Zealand also started FTA negotiations with these countries.
Over a period of time, Asian countries started negotiating their FTAs in more sophisticated 
ways, as compared to their earlier approach of negotiating on the basis of the text prepared 
by the other parties, mainly by the developed countries. New approaches of Asian countries 
have shown new innovations in their FTAs provisions. What was considered an unfeasible 
task has started becoming a reality. New experiments have been made. This chapter focuses 
on these new experiments and trends emerging from the State-to-State dispute settlement 
 1 Senior Lecturer, Justice and Legal Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia; author of book Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism in the FTAs of Asia; Arbitrator at Korean Commercial Arbitration Board; Chief-Editor 
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provisions of the FTAs of Asia. For this purpose, recently signed FTAs of China, South Korea 
and Japan with Australia will be considered. These three countries are powerful economies 
of Asia, and their approach in the dispute settlement in their FTAs can be considered as 
representative of the Asian trend. The FTAs under consideration in this chapter have also 
raised discussions on the Investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. For example, the 
Australia-China FTA has proposed to negotiate an appellate mechanism for Investor-State 
disputes, which is very innovative, and a hot topic in the international arena. However, as 
the focus of this chapter is on State-to-State dispute settlement, discussion on Investor-State 
disputes is beyond the scope of this chapter.
FTAs of China, South Korea and Japan with Australia
The Australia-China FTA was signed on 17 June 2015 and became effective on 20 December 
2015. The Australia-China FTA is the newest FTA of China, which represents a new trend 
in the dispute settlement mechanism of China.
Chapter 15 of the Australia-China FTA contains the State-to-State dispute settlement 
mechanism. In addition to the main provisions, this chapter includes three new items: 
(1) Code of Conduct (Annex-15-A), (2) Model Rules of Procedure for the Arbitral Tribunal 
(Annex-15-B) and (3) Indicative Time Table for the Arbitral Tribunal attached with Annex 
B (Annex 15-B). Code of Conduct, Model Rules and Time Table have now become part of 
the FTA applicable to the State v State disputes. Among these three, the Code of Conduct 
for Arbitrators has been used for the ﬁrst time.
The Korea-Australia FTA was signed on the 8 April 2014 and became effective on 
12 December 2014. Like the Australia-China FTA, the Korea-Australia FTA also shows 
some new trends in dispute settlement. The Korea-Australia FTA also includes a Code 
of Conduct (Annex 20-A), Model Rules of Procedure (Annex 20-B) and an Indicative 
Time Table for a Dispute Settlement Panel as part of the Model Rules of Procedure for 
Dispute Settlement Panel Proceedings (Attachment to Annex 2-B). From the structural 
point of view, the dispute settlement mechanisms of both the Australia-China FTA and the 
Korea-Australia FTA look similar, as Australia is the common partner in both the FTAs. 
Both FTAs were signed in close proximity, so one may see the inﬂuence of one on the other.
The other major Asian economy, Japan, has also signed an agreement with Australia, 
which included the Code of Conduct in its dispute settlement mechanism.2 In contrast with 
Korea and China, the Australia-Japan FTA requires not only arbitrators or panelists but also 
assistants and administrative personnel to comply with the Code of Conduct.3 The Obligation 
of Self-Disclosure contained in the Code of Conduct is exclusively applicable on arbitrators.4
The Code of conduct imposes a duty on arbitrators to remain independent and 
impartial5 and stresses the performance of duties by arbitrators6 and maintenance of 
 2 The Australia-Japan FTA was signed on 8 July 2014 and became effective on 15 January 2015.
 3 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure of Arbitral Tribunals, Para 6.
 4 Section IV of the Code of Conduct of the Australia-Japan FTA contains the provisions of 
Obligation of Self-Disclosure.
 5 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 12–17; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct 
Paras 11–16.
 6 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 4–10; Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 5–11.
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conﬁdentiality.7 As these obligations are important in maintaining the integrity of the 
dispute settlement system, these obligations are included in both the Australia-China FTA 
and the Korea-Australia FTA through the Code of Conduct. The Australia-Japan FTA 
enforces the Code of Conduct on arbitrators, arbitrators’ assistants and administrative 
personnel, thus, the coverage of the Code of Conduct is wider as compared to the 
Australia-China FTA and the Australia-Korea FTA.
Cooperation – a new means of dispute resolution
The Australia-China FTA follows the consistent pattern of China for the dispute settlement 
mechanism in the FTAs of Asia, which encourages “cooperation” as the ﬁrst means of 
resolving disputes and obliges the parties to “make every attempt through cooperation to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect” the operation of the 
Australia-China FTA including the agreement on “the interpretation and application of this 
Agreement.”8 The importance of cooperation as the ﬁrst port of call may be assessed by the fact 
that the recently concluded Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) also emphasises “cooperation.”9
The Korea-Australia FTA has also emphasised “cooperation” and requires parties to 
“endeavour to agree” on the interpretation and implementation of the FTA. Similar to 
the Australia-China FTA, the parties to the Korea-Australia FTA also have to “make every 
attempt through cooperation” to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter 
that might affect the operation of the Korea-Australia FTA.10
The Australia-Japan FTA does not have any stand-alone provision on cooperation, 
like the Australia-China FTA or the Korea-Australia FTA. However, the Australia-Japan 
FTA has “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation,” and the Australia-China FTA has 
“Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation,” together with a cooperation provision. The 
Korea-Australia FTA does not have “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation.” Though 
the Australia-Korea FTA shows the trend of including cooperation as a means of resolving 
disputes, at the same time excluding the means of “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and 
Mediation,” it is still too early to say whether this will be a future trend. It is also a fact that 
almost every FTA includes “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation”; however, the use 
of this method for dispute resolution is insigniﬁcant. Even at the level of WTO, the method 
of “Good Ofﬁces, Conciliation and Mediation” is seldom used.
Though we see the use of cooperation in the dispute settlement mechanism of FTAs now, 
it is too early to understand the implication of this provision. For example, is it an obligation 
that, if breached, may give rise to an action under the FTA? In other words, if parties do not 
cooperate during consultation or at a post-award phase, e.g., for ﬁxing of a reasonable period 
of time, would that mean the cooperation provision has been violated by the recalcitrant 
party and therefore the claimant may initiate another action against the party at fault? 
What standard should be used to ascertain whether a party has breached the cooperation 
obligations or not whenever the tribunal does face such a question? Considering the general 
approach of Asian countries to resolve the dispute amicably, the inclusion of cooperation 
 7 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 19–21; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 18–20.
 8 Australia-China FTA, Article 15.1.
 9 TPP, Article 28.2
 10 Korea-Australia FTA, Article 20.1.
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as the ﬁrst port of call for dispute resolution is laudable, but for the rule-based system of 
dispute resolution, this is far from complete and practical.
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators
Independence and impartiality in any decision-making process is a very important aspect. 
Therefore, the Code of Conduct in the Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia-FTA and 
Australia-Japan FTA has paid special attention to it and provided a general obligation on 
the arbitrators to be “independent and impartial,” to act in a “fair manner” and to avoid 
“creating an appearance of impropriety or bias”.11 It further adds that an arbitrator must 
not be inﬂuenced by self-interests, outside pressure, political considerations, public clamour, 
loyalty to a party or fear of criticism.12 Arbitrators are also required to take action in such 
a manner that it should not give any indication that people at a special position inﬂuence 
them. In order to counter that impression, arbitrators are required to make every effort to 
displace such an impression. Moreover, arbitrators are not allowed to use their position on 
the arbitral tribunal to advance any personal or private interests.13
Past dealings of arbitrators are also under the scanner in the Code of Conduct of the 
Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA. According to 
this Code, arbitrators should not let “past or existing ﬁnancial, business, professional, 
family or social relationships or responsibilities inﬂuence the arbitrators’ conduct and 
responsibilities.”14 Following this responsibility, arbitrators should also refrain from 
“entering into any relationship, or acquiring any ﬁnancial interest” that may affect 
arbitrators’ “impartiality” or “which may create an appearance of impropriety or bias.”15 
In addition to that, arbitrators are also suggested to dispel the appearance that the outcome 
of the decision may, in some way, give beneﬁt to them.16
The Code of Conduct of the Australia-China FTA imposes the responsibility on 
arbitrators to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety,” to be “independent 
and impartial,” to avoid “direct and indirect conﬂicts of interests” and to observe a “high 
standard of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement process 
are preserved.”17 The exact similar responsibility has been imposed on the panelist serving 
under the Korea-Australia FTA.18 Similarly, the Australia-Japan FTA also imposes the same 
obligations on arbitrators.19 Such responsibilities towards the process of dispute settlement 
are very important and therefore each arbitrator or panelist must adhere to them.
 11 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 12; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
11; Australia-Japan FTA; Code of Conduct, Para III (c) and VI (1).
 12 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 13; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
12; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
 13 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 15; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
14; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (4).
 14 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 16; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
15; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
 15 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 17; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
17; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (2).
 16 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 18; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 
14; Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (4).
 17 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 18 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 1.
 19 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VI (1).
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The Code of Conduct of the Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and 
Australia-Japan FTA imposes self-disclosure obligations on arbitrators from the time they 
are invited to sit on a panel to resolve a dispute.20 Arbitrators are required to disclose “any 
interests, relationship or matter that is likely to affect his or her independence or impartiality 
or that might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or bias in the proceedings.”21 
Moreover, it is an obligation on the candidate for arbitration to make “all reasonable 
efforts to become aware of any such interests, relationships and matters.”22 Such obligation 
is a continuous one, which is applicable even during the arbitration process. Therefore, 
arbitrators are required to make their own “reasonable efforts to become aware of any 
interest, relationships and matters and disclose them to the FTA Joint Commission.”23 
However, it does not say whether arbitrators are required to report to the Joint Commission 
or Committee promptly or as soon as they come to know about any interest, relationships 
and matters that may affect their independence and impartiality. As a matter of common 
practice, the reporting should be prompt and take place as soon as such knowledge is acquired. 
The Australia-Japan FTA does not have any provision of reporting to the Joint Committee 
or Commission. In these FTAs, it is to note that the code of conduct is not putting any 
obligation on parties to ﬁnd out about any conﬂict, but the onus is on arbitrators, so that in 
the future, arbitrators may not argue that such information was already known to the parties 
either directly and indirectly or was available in the public domain.
The Australia-Japan FTA has also warned that the application of these disclosure require-
ments should not be made administratively so burdensome that it becomes impracticable 
for qualiﬁed persons to serve as arbitrators. Another point of caution has been suggested 
in the Australia-Japan FTA that while meeting the disclosure requirements, the personal 
privacy of arbitrators should be respected.24 In this respect, the Australia-Japan FTA has set 
the good trend that requirements of disclosure must not transgress into the personal and 
private domain of arbitrators.
Maintenance of conﬁdentiality by arbitrators and parties
There is a general obligation of conﬁdentiality in all the three FTAs under discussion here. 
With regard to the obligation of conﬁdentiality, in the Australia-China FTA, the only 
exception is that an arbitrator or former arbitrator may only disclose conﬁdential information 
as required by legal or constitutional requirements.25 Legal obligations are common as 
an exception to the conﬁdentiality requirement; however, inclusion of “Constitutional” 
requirements is new. Neither China nor Australia has ever included code of conduct in 
their FTAs. Inclusion of Constitutional requirements may be signiﬁcant for Australia, 
but the same is not true in China. In the Chinese Constitution, there is no particular 
provision binding on arbitrators. However, in Australia, Constitution plays a signiﬁcant role 
 20 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2; 
Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para IV.
 21 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 22 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 3; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 2.
 23 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 4; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Para 3. It is to note that there is a terminological difference here because in the Korea-Australia 
FTA there is a Joint “Committee” and not the Joint “Commission”.
 24 Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para IV (3).
 25 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 21.
Free Trade Agreements of China, South Korea and Japan 209
in dispute settlement. Parties more frequently, unlike China, refer to the Constitutional 
provisions in court cases.
The Korea-Australia FTA does not include “Constitutional” requirements. The panelists 
or former panelists can only disclose the deliberations of the panel or views of an individual 
panelist as “required by law.”26 The panelists, as well as the person retained by the panel, 
are required to maintain the conﬁdentiality of panel proceedings and deliberations.27 It is 
a signiﬁcant departure from the Australian point of view between the two FTAs signed 
with China and Korea. Since Korea is a civil law country, the use of Constitution in 
disputes may not be frequent, but there is no explanation for the presence of Constitutional 
requirements in the Australia-China FTA, considering China is a civil law country, too. It 
is also unexplainable as to why Australia prefers inclusion of Constitutional requirements in 
the Australia-China FTA and ignores the same in the Korea-Australia FTA, knowing both 
China and Korea are civil law countries.
The Australia-Japan FTA provides for absolute conﬁdentiality, because even under legal 
or Constitutional order, any covered person, such as arbitrators, arbitrators’ assistants and 
administrative personnel, is not allowed to disclose conﬁdential information. Unlike the 
Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA, there are no exceptions, e.g., “except as 
required by legal or constitutional requirements.” Moreover, the Australia-Japan FTA does 
not impose conﬁdentiality obligation on former arbitrators, as they are obliged to maintain 
conﬁdentiality under the Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA.
Arbitrators are obliged to keep a nonpublic document conﬁdential or even cannot use it 
for the purpose other than the arbitration proceeding. It is also imperative that arbitrators 
do not use such information for their own beneﬁt or for the advantages of others or even 
to adversely affect the interest of others.28 In the Australia-Japan FTA, prohibition against 
the use of conﬁdential information does not include “interest of others” and, in that sense, 
if any conﬁdential information is used to affect the interests of others, then it is debatable 
whether it is against the code of conduct.29 The Korea-Australia FTA is similar to the 
Australia-China FTA, which prohibits the use of conﬁdential information that may affect 
the interests of others.30
Arbitration proceedings, including hearings and deliberations, as well as documents 
submitted for the purpose of arbitration, are conﬁdential.31 Not all documents can be 
conﬁdential, only those documents that are marked conﬁdential by the party providing 
that they are treated as conﬁdential by the other party. However, the party submitting 
conﬁdential information to the tribunal may have to submit a nonconﬁdential summary 
of the designated conﬁdential information within 15 days of such a request. This 
nonconﬁdential information may be made public.32 The Australia-China FTA has made it 
clear that the documents submitted for arbitration may be conﬁdential, and the obligation to 
keep that information conﬁdential is on the receiving party and not on the party providing 
 26 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 20.
 27 Korea-Australia FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 8.
 28 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 19.
 29 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para VII (1).
 30 Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 18.
 31 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 17. As the hearings of the arbitral tribunal is in close 
session and in deliberation only arbitrators are present so these parts of the arbitration proceeding 
are also conﬁdential. See Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Paras 9 &13.
 32 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 17.
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that conﬁdential information. Therefore, the party providing that information may make 
that information, i.e., its own position, public, and that will not be considered breach of 
conﬁdentiality obligation. It is also to note that only documents submitted in arbitration 
are conﬁdential, whereas any document prepared for arbitration or related to arbitration is 
not within the scope of the conﬁdential obligations.
In the Korea-Australia FTA, a party may designate any speciﬁc information conﬁdential 
that it considers strictly necessary to protect privacy or legitimate commercial interest of 
particular enterprises, public or private, or to address essential conﬁdentiality concerns.33 
Therefore, the scope of conﬁdentiality has been extended to private and legitimate 
commercial interest in the Korea-Australia FTA.
Conduct of arbitration proceedings
The Australia-China FTA, Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA provide for the 
duties and performance-related code for arbitrators.34 The ﬁrst duty is to conduct arbitration 
proceedings “with fairness and diligence.”35 No arbitrator is allowed “to deny other ar-
bitrator from taking part in any aspect of the proceeding.”36 This may also include the 
deliberation process. It should be the responsibility of the Chairman to make sure that all 
arbitrators are included in the process from the beginning till the end. There is no such pro-
vision in the Australia-Japan FTA; however, it may be assumed that all arbitrators will take 
part in the decision-making process. The Australia-Japan FTA assumes that each arbitrator 
understands that “prompt settlement of disputes is essential to the effective functioning of 
the Australia-Japan FTA”.37
Arbitrators are not allowed “to delegate their duties of making decision on any other person.”38 
In the Australia-Japan FTA, the same obligation is included; however, the arbitral tribunal 
may permit arbitrators’ assistants, administration personnel, interpreters and translators to be 
present during its deliberations.39 This is because the Code of Conduct allows delegation of 
“duty to decide” to any person “except as provided in the Rules of Procedures.”40 However, 
the Rule of Procedures only allows covered persons to be present during deliberation; it may 
not be assumed that the covered person will make the ﬁnal decision.
This obligation of non-delegation is quite signiﬁcant in terms of the rumours that 
arbitrators ask their assistants to draft the award. The controversial Yukos award has been 
challenged by Russia, on the basis that the assistant to the tribunal spent more hours and was 
paid for those hours, which was more than the time spent by the arbitrators, suggesting that 
perhaps the assistant was asked to draft the award, which was the duty of the arbitral panel.41
 33 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules Para 21.
 34 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Paras 5–11; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Paras 4–10; Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para V (1–5).
 35 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 6; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 5; 
Australia-Japan, Code of Conduct, Para V (2).
 36 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 7; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 6.
 37 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V (1).
 38 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 8; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 7.
 39 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 18.
 40 Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V (4).
 41 Dmytro Galagan, “The Challenge of the Yukos Award-An Award Written by Someone Else-A 
Violation of Tribunal’s Mandate?”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, available at http://kluwerarbitration 
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In arbitration, if the tribunal requires or a party requests, an expert may be engaged to 
assist the tribunal to reach a conclusion. The expert can be an individual or a body. The 
parties will agree on the terms and conditions for engagement of the expert. Any technical 
information or views of the expert so obtained by the tribunal must be provided to the 
parties also for comments.42 This is, of course, to maintain the due process within the 
arbitration proceeding.
Use of Indicative Time Table
The Australia-China FTA provides for a clear timeline for the operation of a dispute 
resolution process. In order to strengthen the importance of time limit and timely exe-
cution of various activities, an “Indicative Time Table for the Arbitral Tribunal” is also 
added as an Annex 15-B attached with the “Model Rules of Procedure for the Arbitral 
Tribunal.”43 An outer limit for the completion of a dispute resolution procedure is set at 
270 days “from the date of establishment of the arbitral tribunal until the issuance of the 
ﬁnal report.”44 This time limit is a general rule, and parties with agreement may change the 
number of days. If the general rule is adhered to, then it is possible to resolve disputes faster 
under the Australia-China FTA, as compared to any other forum.
A similar trend is also noticed in the Korea-Australia FTA, which includes an Indicative 
Time Table for Dispute Settlement Panel, attached to the Model Rules of Procedure for 
Dispute Settlement Panel Proceedings.45 According to this time table, a ﬁnal report is 
expected to be issued between 170 and 240 days from the date of establishment of the 
panel. However, the upper limit of deadline for the issuance of ﬁnal report is 270 days, 
which is the same as that of the Australia-China FTA.46
The Indicative Time Table in the Australia-Japan FTA is even shorter than that of the 
Korea-Australia FTA. In the Australia-Japan FTA, a period of 23–26 weeks is given, which 
is approximately 161–182 days from the date of establishment of the tribunal to release the 
award to the parties.47 At the same time, Proceedings of Arbitral Tribunal declares that 
the maximum days to issue the award to the parties must not be more than 6 months, 
which is approximately 180 days.48 Therefore, in terms of number of days, arbitrators have 
less time under the Australia-Japan FTA as compared to the Australia-China FTA and 
Korea-Australia FTA. From the parties’ point of view, the tribunal can decide a dispute 
faster in the Australia-Japan FTA. All these dates are, of course, a general guideline and 
with the agreement of the parties, it can be extended.49
A time period for the written submissions and documents is also set under the 
Australia-China FTA. For example, the complaining party is required to submit its ﬁrst 
blog.com/2015/02/27/the-challenge-of-the-yukos-award-an-award-written-by-someone-else-a-
violation-of-the-tribunals-mandate/.
 42 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 20; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 26.
 43 See Annex 15-B of Australia-China FTA.
 44 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 2.
 45 See Annex 20-B of Korea-Australia FTA.
 46 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 2 and Annex 20-B.
 47 Australia-Japan FTA, Indicative Time Table, Attachment A.
 48 Australia-Japan FTA, Para 19.9 (6).
 49 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 2; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 2; Australia- 
Japan FTA, Article 19.9 (6).
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written document within 14 days from the date of appointment of the ﬁnal arbitrator, and 
the party complained against is then supposed to submit its reply within 30 days from the 
date of delivery of the ﬁrst written submission by the complaining party.50 The complain-
ing party, in the Korea-Australia FTA, also has 14 days to make its written submission, 
but the respondent has only 21 days.51 In the Australia-Japan FTA, both the complaining 
party and the party complained against have a shorter time, i.e., 10 days and 20 days, 
respectively.52
It may seem unreasonable to give less time to the complaining party as compared to the 
party complained against. However, this may not be the case, as the complaining party 
might have prepared and already submitted most of the information regarding the dispute 
at the time of ﬁling the notice for consultation and for the request for the establishment of 
the panel to resolve the dispute. Therefore, a lesser time period given to the complaining 
party is justiﬁed.
The arbitral tribunal, in the Australia-China FTA, is obligated to commence hearing 30 
days after the submission of the party complained against.53 The initial report also needs 
to be issued 30 days after the receipt of the written supplementary submissions by the 
parties.54 That means that the tribunal has to work at a fast pace to complete the writing of 
the report. Parties are also required to react faster, as they are given only 10 days to make 
written comments on the initial report.55 Thereafter, the tribunal gets only 20 days to make 
the ﬁnal report to the parties.56
The process is even faster in the Korea-Australia FTA, as the tribunal ﬁxes the ﬁrst hearing 
with parties within 20–45 days, and the initial report is issued 60–90 days thereafter. 
However, parties get more days (14 days) to give their comments on the initial report, as 
compared to the Australia-China FTA. The ﬁnal report is made available to the parties 
in 31 days.57 As a general rule, in the Korea-Australia FTA, the panel is bound to give 
“sufﬁcient time to the parties to prepare their submissions.”58
The arbitration process is very fast in the Australia-Japan FTA; therefore, all time 
limits are shorter, as compared to the Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA. 
However, in the Australia-Japan FTA, parties get two substantive hearings, whilst in the 
Australia-China FTA and Korea-Australia FTA, parties get only one hearing.59 In the 
Australia-China FTA, however, parties are allowed to provide written supplementary sub-
missions after the ﬁrst hearing.60 Though the time limit is very short in the Australia- 
Japan FTA, the time period to give comments on the draft award is longer, i.e., 15 days, 
as compared to the Australia-China FTA (10 days) and Korea-Australia FTA (14 days). 
The ﬁnal award in the Australia-Japan FTA is issued to the parties in 15 days after the 
 50 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 4.
 51 Korea-Australia, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para (a).
 52 Australia-Japan FTA, Indicative Time-Table, Para (b).
 53 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 2.
 54 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 4.
 55 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 5.
 56 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Para 6. The time limit is 30 days from 
the date of issuance of the initial report which includes 10 days for the comments to receive from 
the parties.
 57 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules-Indicative Time-Table, Annex 20-B.
 58 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 3.
 59 Australia-Korea FTA, Indicative Time-Table, Annex A, Paras c & e.
 60 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Indicative Time-Table, Para 3.
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submission on their comments, which is faster than the Australia-China FTA (20 days) 
and Korea-Australia FTA (31 days).
Presence of arbitrators in hearings and deliberations
All arbitrators in the hearings and deliberations under the Australia-China FTA are 
required to be present, even though assistants, translators and designated note-takers may 
be present during the hearings who are not allowed to take part in the deliberations.61 In 
the Korea-Australia FTA, assistants, interpreters or translators or designated note-takers 
may be present in the hearings, and with the permission of the parties, they may also 
be present in deliberations.62 In the Australia-Japan FTA, the tribunal may permit the 
presence of arbitrators’ assistants, administration personnel, interpreters and translators 
during deliberations.63 For this purpose, the tribunal in the Australia-Japan FTA may not 
be required to consult parties. Therefore, whilst the Australia-China FTA allows assistants, 
note-takers, interpreters and translators only during hearings but not in deliberations, 
the Korea-Australia FTA allows them to be present in deliberations (and assumed to be 
present during hearings, too). However, according to the Australia-Japan FTA, the tribunal 
on its own may allow those people to be present during deliberations and assume that 
they are allowed to be present during hearings; this is also similar to the situation in the 
Korea-Australia FTA.
All the meetings of the tribunal must be presided over by the Chair of the Tribunal. 
Other arbitrators may delegate authority to the Chair to deal with administrative and 
procedural decisions.64 Such delegation of the authority is good for the efﬁciency of the 
arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes in a speedy matter. There are several administrative 
and procedural decisions that are important that can be taken by the Chair alone, without 
involving other arbitrators.
In the Australia-China FTA, arbitral hearings are not mandatory. They can only be 
organised if parties agree to an oral hearing.65 In case the oral hearing is arranged, the 
tribunal must ensure an equal amount of time for each party.66 The Chair of the Tribunal 
ﬁxes the time limit with a view to providing equal time to parties.67 It is to note that due 
process is satisﬁed by giving an equal amount of time, and there is no obligation to provide 
a “reasonable,” “full” or “adequate” opportunity to present the case. At the hearing, 
ﬁrst the complaining party is given the opportunity to make its argument, followed by 
arguments of the party complained against. After the main arguments, the complaining 
party is given time to make a reply, followed by a counter-reply by the party complained 
against.68
 61 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 9.
 62 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 7.
 63 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 18.
 64 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 10; Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 5; Australia- 
Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 16.
 65 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 12.
 66 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
 67 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
 68 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 14.
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Language in arbitration
Chinese is the language of China, and English is the language of Australia, but the 
Australia-China FTA includes English as the working language of the arbitral proceeding. 
This is not a strange provision, considering China has agreed to use English as the working 
language in other FTAs that it has signed.
The Australia-Japan FTA provides use of dual language in arbitration. It provides that the 
proceedings of the arbitral tribunal are to be conducted in both English and Japanese. The 
same condition is also applicable on oral and written submissions.69 It is the obligation on 
a party to provide translation of the written submission in the language of the other party 
and consequently bear the cost of translation.70 In other words, if Australia submits a docu-
ment in English, then it has to get that document translated into Japanese and also bear the 
cost of the translation. However, the cost of interpretation is borne by the parties in equal 
share. For the purpose of interpretation, the Australia-Japan FTA provides a general rule 
that the party in whose capital a meeting is held will be responsible for organising interpre-
tation services for the meeting.71 One may argue that the use of dual languages may delay 
the process; at the same time, it may also be argued that a proceeding in a native language 
of the parties may result in a well-informed decision. China and Korea also have language 
differences with Australia, but those two countries have not agreed to the dual languages 
proceeding with Australia.
Venue of hearing
It is believed that parties in a dispute may enjoy the local advantage if the venue of the 
hearing is set in their country. This presumption is dispelled in the Australia-China FTA. 
The parties’ agreement is respected in the Australia-China FTA, so the ﬁrst method of 
deciding the venue of the hearing is through parties’ agreement. If, for some reasons, 
parties cannot agree on the venue of the arbitration hearing, then as default rule, the ﬁrst 
hearing will be conducted in the territory of the parties complained against. The second 
hearing and any further hearings thereafter will be conducted alternatively in the territories 
of the parties. In other words, the second hearing will be conducted in the territory of the 
complaining party, and the third hearing will be organised in the territory of the party 
complained against.72 A similar approach has been adopted in the Korea-Australia FTA, 
too.73 However, the decision on the venue of the meeting has been left to the Chair in 
the Australia-Japan FTA to decide in consultation with the parties and other arbitrators.74 
There is no default rule on venue in the Australia-Japan FTA, similar to the Australia-China 
FTA and Australia-Japan FTA.
Considering the size of China and Australia, parties still have to agree on the venue, for 
example, whether the venue of the hearing should be in the capital or any other place. The 
Model Rules in the Australia-China FTA do not shed any light on that. Therefore, for all 
practical purposes, both Australia and China have to agree on a venue. The only innovation 
 69 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 37.
 70 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 38.
 71 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 39.
 72 Australia-China FTA, Model Rules, Para 22.
 73 Korea-Australia FTA, Model Rules, Para 29.
 74 Australia-Japan FTA, Rules of Procedure, Para 4.
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one can note in this provision is that the venue is not limited to the capital city; rather, it 
could be organised anywhere within the territory of a party. Depending upon the nature of 
the dispute, sometimes it would be helpful to organise the hearing at a place that has more 
evidence of the measures in dispute.
Implications of violations of the Code of Conduct
Violation of the Code of Conduct by an arbitrator is itself a determinable matter; 
therefore, no arbitrator is allowed to “communicate matters concerning actual or potential 
violations.”75 If the matter is necessary to ascertain whether an arbitrator has violated 
or may violate the Code of Conduct, then an arbitrator may communicate such matter, 
otherwise that arbitrator has to inform both parties. This is perhaps for the purpose of 
maintaining the integrity of the questionable arbitrator, unless the FTA Joint Committee 
of the Australia-China FTA or Korea-Australia FTA, as the case may be, ﬁnally resolves 
the matter. China, Korea and Japan have set the trend of making the violation of code of 
conduct itself a disputable ground.
Arbitrators in a commercial arbitration are familiar with such codes, but the same 
arbitrators may not be compelled to follow such codes when deciding State v State disputes 
under FTAs. Now, with the inclusion of the Code of Conduct in the Australia-China FTA, 
Korea-Australia FTA and Australia-Japan FTA, arbitrators will be bound by the code, and 
violation of this code may lead to removal of arbitrators.
Conclusion
China, South Korea and Japan have set a new and positive trend in the dispute settlement 
mechanism of their FTAs. The most important trend is to include the Code of Conduct 
for arbitrators in the dispute settlement system. This Code of Conduct is a package, 
which covers independence, impartiality and other necessary measures that are important 
for maintaining the integrity of the dispute-resolution mechanism. In the commercial 
arbitration world, such measures are common and have been in use for a long time; how-
ever in the FTA dispute-resolution system, such measures were not used until recently. 
In other words, arbitrators under the FTA dispute settlement system were not under 
strict scrutiny, as compared to any commercial arbitration. The whole Code of Conduct 
is binding on arbitrators, which is a very positive development, but the rule relating to 
self-disclosure is far more important. According to this rule, the obligation is on the ar-
bitrator to disclose any situation of actual or apparent bias and not on the parties. From 
the parties’ perspective, this is a big relief. In this regard, it is also important to note 
that the personal and private information of arbitrators should not be of public scrutiny. 
Therefore, Japan has made it clear that the obligations of self-disclosure on arbitrators 
should not be administratively cumbersome and go beyond its purpose, so that a quali-
ﬁed person may not be able to perform the main duty of resolving disputes. In essence, a 
ﬁne balance should be maintained for this purpose. Separate Model Rules of Procedures 
for arbitration are another signiﬁcant development in the FTAs of China, South Korea 
and Japan, which provide default rules for arbitration, unless parties agree otherwise. In 
 75 Australia-China FTA, Code of Conduct, Para 11; Korea-Australia FTA, Code of Conduct, 
Para 10. Australia-Japan FTA, Code of Conduct, Para V(5)
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the FTA dispute settlement system, earlier emphasis was not put on rules of procedure, 
but rather, it was left open for the tribunal to design or adopt them in consultation with 
parties. The default rules are now available for the arbitral tribunal to follow, which has 
been negotiated between the parties. The presence of default rules in the FTAs of China, 
South Korea and Japan will help develop a consistent application of rules in any arbitra-
tion under the respective FTAs. Similarly, an Indicative Time Table sets the clock right 
from the beginning for the parties, as well as for the Tribunal, to resolve the disputes in 
a timely manner. From a logistics point of view, the Time Table is easy to refer to now, as 
compared to the past. In the earlier FTAs, one could only calculate the time period by 
reading various provisions in the FTAs. From the users’ point of view, one may quickly 
compare as to which FTAs may help resolve the dispute in a timely manner. Arbitrators 
will also be mindful of the time limit before they accept appointment. Otherwise, in 
commercial arbitration or in investment arbitration, delay in issuing the award has be-
come very common. Finally, use of cooperation as the means of dispute resolution has 
become the hallmark of Asian FTAs, particularly those of China and South Korea. From 
an Asian perspective, cooperation between disputants is always appreciated in resolving 
their disputes. However, it is not settled yet, the legal implication of this cooperation 
provision as to whether any violation of this obligation may give rise to any cause of 
action or not.
It has been argued that proliferation of FTAs may have an impact on the domestic 
courts in the administration of justice. Similar arguments have been raised about the 
impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on domestic jurisdiction, which is a valid 
point. This is because, as a member of the WTO, all members are required to align their 
domestic rules with the WTO rules. For example, law on intellectual property rights, 
anti-dumping and so on are a few examples that forced every members of the WTO to 
amend their local laws in line with the WTO rules. China is one example, which has 
to amend more than a thousand legislations and rules to bring them in line with the 
WTO requirements. If there is any violation of WTO rules, then a member of the WTO 
may initiate dispute against the member who is alleged to violate WTO rules. The general 
impact of FTA on domestic legislation has not been evident. One may see the change in 
rules in favour of FTA partners. For example, change in rules of origin, lower threshold for 
establishing service companies and so forth may have been put in place in light of speciﬁc 
FTAs. To this extent, one may argue that FTAs have some impact on domestic legislations. 
At the same time, it should be noted that such favourable treatment to a FTA partner is 
allowed under the WTO, and it is not considered as the violation of Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) principle. Disputes under FTAs are not common. In Asia, no bilateral FTA has 
been invoked yet for a formal dispute settlement. However, a rule-based dispute settlement 
system in a FTA gives predictability about how a dispute might be resolved as and when 
that may arise.
With these new trends in action, one may conclude that China, South Korea and Japan 
are developing a new Asian style of dispute resolution mechanism in their FTAs, whether 
signed with developed or developing countries.
